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Article 2

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS II
Senator John Sherman Cooper*
My native State is Kentucky and I'm glad to say that I think it has done
well toward eliminating compulsory segregation. Louisville, under the leadership of Superintendent Omer Carmichael, provided an outstanding exampld
of voluntary compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling which other communities in Kentucky have followed. Kentucky has its closest ties with the
South, yet it is correct to say that our problem is not as complicated as those
of our neighbors to the South. The proportion of negro students to the total
school enrollment in Kentucky is relatively small. In the 1956-57 school
year, only 38,000 were enrolled in a total of nearly 600,000 in our public
schools.
If you will permit me, I would like, at the beginning, to give some
account of my position on the problems of desegregation, not so much as
a personal matter, but because it may throw light upon the statements that I
will make. I have supported, and support without question today, the decision
of the Supreme Court, both its constitutional and legal reasoning, and also I
support it because of my religious and philosophical beliefs. In the Senate of
the United States, I supported the Civil Rights Bill, passed in 1957, including
the controversial Title Three. I am sure you remember that Title Three was
the section which authorized the intervention of the Attorney General to
enforce rights when individuals could not enforce them themselves. Although
agreeing with Justice Frankfurter that "The use of force to further obedience
to the law is, in any event, the last resort and one not congenial to the spirit
of our nation", I supported the President's action in sending troops to Little
Rock, because the law of the land was forcibly resisted. I would like to believe,
and I do believe, that I would have held my beliefs wherever I might have
lived, yet I know that my background and problems have not been, and are
not, the same as members of the Congress from the southern states.
I appreciate very much Dean O'Meara's clear statement of the purposes
of this symposium and his forthright admonition against our discouragement.
He has said that we are here "to concentrate on the practical problems arising
from the Supreme Court's decision and to consider the responsibilities of
public officials, the churches, and private institutions, and of the community
as a whole, towards their solution."
As I tried to prepare for my talk this evening, I must confess that I felt
that the field of ideas had been well considered and worked by others, and
solutions seemed more and more difficult to me. I hope you will take what I
say as my best thoughts at this time and will treat my statements as questions
for your criticism and your new suggestions.
*
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the segregation by
the state of races by law in public schools, as in other parts of our public life,
is the denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. This decision overturned the rule of separate-but-equal that
the southern section of our country had been following with court approval
for many years. I think it was inevitable that this decision requiring great
changes in the vital field of public education would cause great problems in
transition even if acceptance of the decision was obtained. But difficult as
the problems of transition are, where consent obtains, or at least where no
active resistance is offered, they are not the ones which cause the greatest
concern. The issue of greatest concern, at least to my mind, is the unwillingness
to accept the law, violent resistance to the law, and at worst, evasion and
defiance of the law by public officials and by state governors. Now these
attitudes, as Governor McKeldin has pointed out, are held by large groups of
our fellow Americans. Some come from prejudices and local habits and
customs, but some are held with sincere belief in their validity. That may be
hard to believe, but last year I had occasion to visit two southern states and
to talk to leaders who were understanding of the integrationist position. Yet
many of them told me that they expected it would be years before the great
body of people of their states would accept desegregation and, of course, in
the debate in the Senate in 1957, I heard the constitutional, legal, and social
arguments made in the Senate by my colleagues from the southern states. I
shall never forget, I wanted to hear particularly one member of the Senate
from the southern states; one who I knew as a man without prejudice, a man
of deep religious convictions, and yet I listened to him say, in effect, that
there was a system in the South which they would defend and support. I shall
never forget, when I heard him speak, of how I felt of the depth and the
difficulty of this problem.
In general terms, it seems to me that the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Brown, and subsequent cases, and the resistence and defiance to its
orders, presents two crises. One crisis is a constitutional one. Shall the principle of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution, and
interpreted by the Court be flouted in its application to negro citizens because it fies in the face of long hallowed, but discriminatory customs and
practices? To this question I think there can be only one answer. If we are
to maintain the structure of law and order upon which high society is based,
until the Constitution is altered it is the duty of all to adhere to it, to honor
it, and to defend it, and this is a duty which every citizen, and particularly
every public official, is under a duty, to recognize, to support, and enforce.
Our crisis, as Father Hesburgh has suggested, is one of ethics. The root of
our democratic system, growing from our religious beliefs, is the principle
of the disgnity and worth of every human being, and from this principle
and our reliance and faith in God, we derive our concepts of justice, brotherhood, and mercy. Can we, in good conscience, permit our practices to deny
or religious principles in the nature of our political system? "Faith without
works", to quote the ancient writings, "is dead." We must live our beliefs
or see the moral basis of our life and of our free system of government
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corroded by the failure of our practices. These crises require the steady
enforcement of the law. They require also the steady and wise effort of all
those who believe in the Constitution and the moral soundness of these
decisions to secure its acceptance and consent upon which its support must
ultimately rest. And both enforcement and consent are related. It is important
what the people think about this decision. The laws are not obeyed because
they are laws but because people believe they are right. We say that we
believe in government by the consent of the people. And when the validity
of a law is in dispute, the people's response to it may prove to be decisive.
I should like to discuss first the problem of enforcement. As a member
of Congress, I am aware of a special responsibility arising out of the last
clause of the fourteenth amendment which says, "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." I want
to discuss the role of Congress in the context of the whole role of government
and enforcing this particular requirement of the Constitution, and also in the
context of the word "appropriate." In doing so, of course, I present my own
views and I am sure they are not the views of everyone in Congress. There
are before the Senate today, three bills or groups of bills. The bill introduced
by Senator Johnson, in its reference to desegregation, would provide a community-relations service to assist in reaching solutions, and to avoid force. The
groups of bills introduced by Senator Dirksen of which I am a close sponsor,
represents the administration's views. The one bill in the administration
group which deals specifically with desegregation, other than one asking for
the extension of the Civil Rights Commission, would amend the criminal
code and make it a federal offense to wilfully use force, or the threat of
force, to obstruct court orders in school desegregation cases. The bill introduced by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, Senator Javits of New York
and others, includes a revised version of the Title Three offered by the administration in 1957 which was rejected by Congress. In addition, the
Douglas-Javits Bill provides a method for the establishment of desegregation
plans for local communities by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare if local school agencies fail to act. To my view, the administration
bill and the Douglas-Javits Bill, although their ends are the same, present
quite different concepts as to the role of the Congress in providing supplementary legislation. The administration approach is limited. It adds to the
power of the courts a new instrument to enforce their orders. But it is only in
those cases where the court has assumed jurisdiction over the complaint of an
individual that his right of desegregation, his right not to be discriminated
against in education, had been denied. This new instrument would reside in
the authority of the Attorney General to immediately arrest and bring to
prosecution members of mobs obstructing the orders of the court as a result
of the experience in the Little Rock case. I believe this authority would constitute a powerful instrument against such mobs as formed at Little Rock,
Clinton, Tennessee, and other places, for the immediate arrest of their ringleaders would tend to prevent the formation and the violence of mobs. I
think this amendment is important and that it should be adopted.
Now, whether or not it is from the usual pride of authorship, I mention
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an amendment which I offered to the Civil Rights Bill in 1957 as a limited
version of Title Three when it was evident that Title Three would be defeated. We know that the Attorney General does enter proceedings today in
desegregation cases as a friend of the court but, as a friend of the court, he
comes by invitation and he may not be clothed with the full powers of a
litigant. In brief explanation, my amendment would have authorized the
Attorney General to intervene with the full powers of a litigant and to institute
a civil action for preventive relief, including injunctions and restraining
orders, against any persons conspiring to prevent compliance with the order
of the United States Court issued to secure the equal protection of the law to
any purpose. I point out that that is a limited version of Title Three because
it would have only become applicable after the court had entered an order.
I must say my amendment was defeated, resoundingly, by the extremes,
those who would have Title Three or nothing else, and the southern bloc
which resisted any intervention by the Attorney General. But it was my view,
and it is my view today, that when a court of the United States has issued its
order and the order is defied, usually by a third party in these cases, that the
United States should have the immediate power and the right, without invitation, to act through the Attorney General to uphold the dignity and
authority of the decrees of its own Court. The Douglas-Javits Bill goes further
than the administration's proposal. It is directed toward reaching those areas
of the South where no effort towards compliance is being made, or where
individuals for various reasons, cannot assert their rights in the courts. As I
have said, it would also enable the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to develop plans for desegregation if local agencies do not act. I would
say that to the extent the Douglas-Javits Bill - and I have great respect
for them and for their co-sponsors - would transfer desegregation planmaking from local school bodies to the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, or to a federal agency, I think it unwise at this particular time. Without trying to predict how even I would vote on these bills in their final form,
and with full sympathy for the purposes of these proposals, I want to make
the case for leaving primary jurisdiction with local authorities reviewable
by the federal district court. My argument rests chiefly on the need for
getting desegregation plans devised and proposed by local school boards and
approved by local communities. What we look forward to is that negro children shall be admitted, in time, by the consent of the community, rather than
by court order over the bitter opposition of the school board in the white
community. The Federal Administrative Agency with primary jurisdiction in
this field would, I am afraid, be less able to bring about local adoption and
support of desegregation plans in the federal district court. The federal
district courts are in as relatively good position to judge the community
situation as any other body. There is time for the local school board, there
has been too much time, to propose a plan for gradual transition. But the
recent Charlottesville case has shown that even at the last stage of litigation,
when it seemed that the court had nothing left to do but to admit negro
litigants, the district judge granted the school board time to work out a
compromise plan and this plan was then approved by the court. The result
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was a gradual plan but there is reason to believe that the majority of the
people in Charlottesville will stand behind it. This is the kind of outcome
the Supreme Court must have had in mind when it left the approval of
particular local plans to the federal district court and I quote that part of
the decision.
The full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities
have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems. Courts will have to consider whether action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation on the governing constitutional principles, the cause of their proximity to local conditions
and the possible need for further hearings. The courts which originally
heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.'

Of course, any such process of local solution is impossible in the face of
massive resistance to the very idea of desegregation by the state government.
But I do not know of any more effective way to break down such massive
resistance than the action of the federal court. This is what finally happened
in Virginia, and will, in time, I am sure, happen in the remaining states
openly defying the Supreme Court. As you know, there is a case now
pending involving these statutes which have been passed by the state of
Arkansas. It seems to me those statutes challenge the ultimate right of
the federal government itself to legislate in this field. I am sure, in my own
judgment, that this effort which goes to the ultimate question will be rejected
by the court. I point out that when, through litigation, the state of Virginia
had made all the arguments possible and taken all the available appeals, the
choice was reached between abandoning public education and beginning the
transition to desegregation. The governor and people of Virginia last appeared
to be choosing public schools with local option. This choice was then made
through the long, deliberative process of litigation. Supreme Court procedures
for a local solution have worked. Dean O'Meara has called attention to the
Nashville plan. In Nashville, the local school board had sought to delay any
plan of desegregation as long as possible. But when faced with the prospect
of an order for abrupt desegreation, the board devised, approved, and submitted to the court its own gradual plan - the grade-a-year desegregation
plan, beginning with the first grade. Today desegregation is proceeding in
Nashville with substantial support from the community. In many communities,
the Nashville plan may be too slow in the particular circumstances and the
court will make that decision. But it is my view that it is at least a minimum
plan that all southern communities should accept. To be sure, much of the
desegregation that has taken place in the South is on a token scale, but the
important thing is to make steady progress.
Now I sum up this question of enforcement. I do not think that Congress
should try to take from federal district courts the primary jurisdiction of
assessing the adequacy of desegregation plans, nor do I believe it is possible
for Congress to adopt a national timetable for desegregation. Leaving the
pace to be set by litigation is slow and troublesome but I think it is a necessary
1

Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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procedure at this time. I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing that
Congress can do or should do to facilitate desegregation. I have suggested in
this talk that we promptly adopt the administration proposal to impose criminal sanctions upon those who wilfully obstruct court orders in school desegregation cases. I suggest that, at a minimum, Congress should authorize
the Attorney General to intervene with full power to institute civil preventive
action against persons or state agencies obstructing the orders of a federal
court.
But now I know we come to the ultimate question: What shall the
government of the United States do when a state, or communities in a state,
or large groups of its citizens will not accept the Brown decision, will not
submit a desegregation plan, or worse, defy the Constitution and the federal
government? We hope that steady enforcement, persuasion, and time will at
last solve these ultimate situations. But we do not know that this will be so.
It is to meet such a situation that I voted for Title Three of the original Civil
Rights Bill. And today I believe power should be given to the Attorney
General to intervene when requested to do so and to sue on behalf of those
whose rights are denied and who, for reasons of poverty or fear of retaliation,
cannot sue because of the necessity of at last securing consent and acceptance
to the Brown decision by the South. I beileve this authority should be used
by the Attorney General's discretion, and only when there is substantial
evidence that the process described by the Brown case could not prevail. It
is certain that the Attorney General will be placed under great pressure to
intervene where it would be unwise to do so, in situations where local action
and consent could in a reasonable time work their way. But these are risks
that must be taken when authority and discretion are provided. I believe it
more important to provide a well defined Title Three authority or Title Six
authority in the Douglas Bill, to the Attorney General so that it would be
known that if the reasonable means provided by the Brown case will not be
followed, the Government of the United States will have the necessary power
to support its Constitution and the equal rights of its citizens. There are proposed other measures of aid to the states, financial aid and so forth, which are
good, but which I do not have time to discuss tonight. I will mention and
I hope very much, as I know you do, that the Civil Rights Commission will
be continued because of the record of the great work and the great opportunities that it has.
I have come to the close of my remarks about legislative measures of
enforcing the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and particularly
the right not to be segregated by races in public schools.
I turn now to another side of the problem - that of the responsibility of
working to secure acceptance and consent to the basic law. When I speak of
consent, I do not condone or admit disobedience to the law. Where, as Justice
Frankfurter said in the case of Cooper v. Aaron, arising from the Little Rock
situation, "On the few tragic occasions in the history of the nation, North and
South, when law was forcibly resisted or systematically evaded, it has signalled
the breakdown of constitutional processes of government on which ultimately
rests the liberties of all."' But in the same decision, Justice Frankfurter pointed
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out that in our system of government "The duty to abstain from resistance
to 'the supreme Law of the Land,' .. . does not require immediate approval
of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be still. Active
obstruction or defiance is barred." 3 Again in the Brown and subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court recognized that time would be required to secure approval and compliance with the law. In these cases we find the recognition
of local habits and customs of differing circumstances that will permit different plans. And we find such phrases as "deliberate speed," and such sentences
as: "Only the constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced
civilization demands and the Constitution confirms." 4 What can Congress do,
the government do, the people do to encourage this consent in acceptance of
law which is also a part of a free system? I quote again Justice Frankfurter in
the case of Cooperv. Aaron:
Local customs, however hardened by time, are not decreed in heaven.
Habits and feelings they engender may be counter-acted and moderated.
Experience attests that such local habits and feelings will yield gradually,
though this be, to law and education. And educational influences are
exerted not only by explicit teachings. They vigorously flow from the
fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with political
official power and from the almost-unconsciously transforming actualities of living under the law. 5

The courts have made a magnificent record in individual cases, and in
the whole series of Virginia cases, towards demonstrating the actuality of
living under the law. Let us remember that these are southern courts.
Educational influence will flow as the courts have said, "from the fruitful
exercise of the responsibility of those charged with political power." The
consistent, steady support of the Executive, of Congress, and of elected
officials, to the Brown decision as the law of the land and the willingness of
the Congress to enact needed and reasonable legislation of enforcement and
aid will have their effect. The most helpful development that could occur, in
my opinion, would be the acceptance of the Brown decision as the law of the
land and the beginning of constructive steps towards compliance by responsible citizens in the southern states. Surely we must believe that in these
states, in the churches, the schools, the legal profession, the labor unions,
and among the citizenship of the South, there are those who will help to solve
this problem which is national, as well as sectional, and these groups might
be stimulated and assisted by their counterparts in other sections of the
country, and by such symposiums as this.
I know that these remarks will seem too general to some, to others, an
inadequate program, and perhaps to others, too extreme. If all of us consider
the problem we discuss here, we will move with a steady hope that we might
cut through this problem by some single sweeping stroke and reveal the
essential fairness and justice of the American political process but I can offer
no single instrument capable of this achievement. Yet I do not believe my
358 U.S. 1, 22 (1958).
Id. at 24.
4 Id. at 25.
5 Ibid.
2
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remarks are wholly negative for I believe that in the long run the legal and
moral disciplines of our system will correct abuses, will isolate those who
abuse power, and come to the support of those who are abused by it. Justice
Holmes said: "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which
become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached." 6
The Catholic bishops in their statement on racial discrimination in the
moral law stated that "The problems we inherit today are rooted in decay,
even centuries of custom and cultural patterns. Changes in deep-rooted
attitudes are not made overnight. When we are confronted with complex and
far-reaching evils, it is not a sign of weakness or timidity to distinguish among
remedies and reforms. Some changes are more necessary than others. Some
are relatively easy to achieve. Others seem impossible at this time. What may
succeed in one area may fail in another .... -7
It may be that at last the solution of this problem will be found in the
willingness of the people of our country to admit our common moral heritage.
We distinguish our own system from the Soviet Union in our belief that even
before practice, there were principles, deep religious principles, and they
are based upon the identity of man under God. Perhaps that, at last, will be
our solution. Finally the bishops said, "Clearly, then, these problems are
vital and urgent. May God give this nation the grace to meet the challenge
it faces. For the sake of generations of future Americans, and indeed of all
humanity, we cannot fail.""

6 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
7 59 CAmH. SCHOL. 3. 50, 51 (1959).
8 Ibid.

